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The Antidumping Act:
Proposals for Change
NOEL HEMMENDINGER

THE LONG VIEW

The Antidumping Act 1 is in great trouble. Most of its
troubles flow from a basic misconception about the role of an antidumping proceeding. A dumping case is sometimes looked on as
analogous to private party litigation in which domestic producers seek
to vindicate "rights" being injured by foreign exporters. In another
view, it is sometimes regarded as analogous to a criminal proceeding
in which the United States condemns and punishes certain methods
of foreign price competition as "unfair." In my view, it is preferable to
look at an antidumping proceeding as a method of resolving a conflict
in the execution of the economic foreign policy of the United States.
It is not feasible to attempt to characterize most methods of price
competition as "fair" or "unfair," depending on the price charged in
the home market. While egregious sales below home market prices
are readily apparent, in many cases it is not known to anyone, including the foreign producer itself, whether sales are at less than fair
value (hereinafter LTFV) under the American law until an exhaustive investigation has taken place. Even then, the decision is frequently arbitrary and capricious, because it depends so much upon
the skill and pertinacity with which the data are presented on both
sides and with which they are evaluated by the Customs Service and
the Treasury Department.
The Antidumping Act tends to discourage a large segment of normal, rational business behavior. Discrimination in pricing among
different markets is a norm of business practice; a major entrepreneur who does not enjoy monopoly power in all its markets cannot
avoid it. Low pricing violates the laws governing unfair competition
Noel Hemmendinger is a member of the District of Columbia Bar and a
senior partner in the law firm of Arter, Hadden and Hemmendinger, Washington, D.C. The author's firm represents a number of foreign exporters and
American importers. The views expressed herein are those of the author and
not necessarily those of his partners or clients.
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only if it is predatory-designed to drive competitors out of business
2
with a view to, and the capability of, monopolizing the market. Not
all unfair prices, as defined in antidumping laws, constitute unfair
competition. Predatory intent cannot be inferred from pricing below
the prices in the home market, but only from prices at less than
marginal variable cost.
The difference between fair and unfair is also irrelevant to the
welfare of the importing country. Again excepting predatory dumping, the effect on the economy of the importing country is the same
whether the home market of the imported product is above or below
the import price. When objection is taken to the effects of imports in
our market, we should consider what those effects have been, and
whether they are good or bad; only secondarily, if at all, should we
consider the circumstances abroad that generated the imports.
The view that an antidumping case is an act of economic policy
suggests that it may often not be in the country's best interests to
proceed with the investigation. Simply beginning an antidumping
investigation may have such a deterrent impact on importers that
imports vital to the United States economy are dried up. Treasury
already recognizes that the prosecution of an antidumping investigation may be undesirable. In 1976 the Secretary discontinued the
massive automobile cases on unprecedented grounds; basically, he
3
felt that it did not serve the United States' best interests to proceed.
Similarly, Treasury devised the Trigger Price Mechanism (hereinafter TPM) to avoid having to carry through a multiplicity of investigations of steel imports. 4 Not only are the formal investigations
complex and time-consuming, more importantly, rigorous enforcement of the Act would have virtually stopped steel imports, to the
detriment of the United States economy.
To understand the deterrent effect of a dumping complaint it is
necessary to understand the uncertainties and risks faced by the importer. The uncertainty may last for thirteen months (sixteen
months, if Treasury extends the investigation in a complex case),A
After a determination of LTFV sales has been made, appraisement is
withheld on the imports in question and the importer must post bond
equal to the entire value of the imported goods. 6 This can quickly
become very expensive, and can very quickly shut off imports. But
even before the final LTFV determination, the mere filing of a dumping complaint inhibits imports.
There may be cases in which importers have continued an injurious dumping trade up until the last moment before suspension of
appraisement, and even increased shipments to beat a deadline.
However, a more common consequence is that exporters try only to
complete outstanding contracts and immediately become cautious in
making new contracts. They do not want to be tagged as dumpers,
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and they want to create the best possible image to encourage either
discontinuance by Treasury or a no-injury finding by the ITC.
Another common response by the dumper is to raise prices to a level
safe from charges of dumping. Either way, simply beginning a
dumping investigation has a chilling effect on competitive sales.
This chilling effect has on occasion been strong enough to actually
risk harm to the United States economy, and to require in the national interest that steps be taken to discourage or discontinue dumping investigations.
For these reasons, proceedings under the Act should not be regarded as simple law enforcement, but rather as involving a complex
exercise in administrative discretion. To treat them as law enforcement is part of a broad trend in the United States toward dealing
with almost every problem through legal proceedings in which there
are rights, remedies, hearings, discovery, appeals, and all the other
paraphernalia of the modern legal process. The antidumping proceeding has become a form of litigation, and the more it acquires the
paraphernalia of litigation, the more it becomes unsuitable to the
problem. In this respect, it is not entirely different from the attempt
to regulate other types of trade through massive suits under the antitrust laws.
Treasury's bureaucratic response has changed from an administrative proceeding virtually run out of the pocket of a Deputy Assistant
Secretary and frequently discontinued upon assurances that the low
pricing would cease, to an administrative proceeding with confidential and nonconfidential records, formal disclosures, hearings, and
appeals. Originally, it was possible to represent an entire foreign
industry for several months of a lawyer's time, with an equivalent
expenditure on the complainant's side. Today, a modest antidumping
proceeding involving a number of foreign companies will usually include a law firm for each company and repeated submissions representing years of lawyers' time, just for the Treasury proceedings.
Like some other forms of litigation, the antidumping proceeding is a
juggernaut that cannot be turned off. It also consumes vast amounts
of time for the government staffs involved.
Despite the adversary character of the modern antidumping case, it
remains fundamentally an administrative investigation involving the
collection and evaluation of economic data, first by the Treasury Department and second by the ITC. If the proceedings are to be manageable, it is necessary to place limits on the extent to which the evidence
and the argument can be strung out, to place limits on the elaboration
of rules, both substantive and procedural, and to accept with as good
grace as possible the fact that whether they come quickly or at great
length, the results will reflect fallible human judgments. Most importantly, it is necessary to incorporate into the administration of the law
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considerations of the public interest, which the statute does not presently recognize, extending beyond the question whether a particular
American industry is injured by the importations at the margins in
question. When major industries are involved, it will frequently be
true that the best way of dealing with the problem is a negotiation
with the foreign countries most concerned. This is, in effect, what has
been done in the case of steel, although the TPM has a somewhat
unilateral flavor.
Because an antidumping proceeding involves the exercise of public
power to promote the country's economic welfare, the appropriate
investigation should be much broader than the narrow questions of
LTFV sales and injury to domestic producers. As noted above, the
proper line of investigation is to consider all of the effects of the
imports, and whether those effects are good or bad. Such an examination would be a two-part inquiry. First, are imports indeed threatening the viability of a domestic industry. Second, if there is such
injury, what measures, if any, should be taken to protect the industry, taking into account all circumstances of the trade and all elements of the national interest? By coincidence, we already have on
the books a law requiring exactly that inquiry-section 201 of the
7
1974 Act, familiarly known as the escape clause.
It is curious that recent pronouncements on foreign economic policy have characterized invocation of the escape clause as contrary to
free trade principles, while companies and industries complaining of
import competition have been exhorted to invoke laws that are actually more protectionist, such as the Antidumping Act, the countervailing duty law and other laws against unfair competition.8 This is
in spite of the fact that under the escape clause the President would
have the authority to weigh all the interests concerned and to use
with flexibility all of the conceivable instruments of control; conversely, the only antidumping remedy is the assessment of special
duties to offset the claimed unfairness, and neither the President nor
the Secretary of the Treasury has any final authority to take into
account other elements of the national interest. 9
There is a reason for such apparent irrationality. If it is up to the
President to decide whether imports are to be restricted, and therefore also to decide whether any particular domestic industry shall be
protected, an onerous political burden is placed on the President
from which he must be shielded. This shield, however, cannot be
complete; if the consequences of the antidumping remedies are unacceptable, the President may still find it necessary to intervene, as
he did through the TPM for the steel industry.'0
The escape clause already fulfills all of the sound purposes of an
antidumping act, without the overly protectionist consequences of
the Antidumping Act. The United States would save itself many
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headaches, both foreign and domestic, and would achieve more sensible results, if it were to repeal the Antidumping Act and look chiefly
to other avenues for dealing with the problems raised by imports at
prices the domestic industry finds oppressive.
THE NEAR VIEW

It is out of the question that Congress will repeal the Antidumping
Act, or even revise it along lines suggested here, in the foreseeable
future. It is therefore necessary to consider measures that have some
chance of success in the medium and short term.
A Single Form of Proceeding
The most interesting of these is an idea that seems to have taken
hold in a number of different places-the adoption of a single form of
proceeding to obtain relief from imports."' Such a single proceeding
would relieve the petitioners of the risk and burden of selecting one
or more types of proceedings. Under present law, it can be very difficult to determine what statutory remedy should be sought. While
there is no theoretical bar to seeking relief through all channels at
once, this is inordinately expensive and is likely to create resistance
on the part of the triers of fact and lead to justified importer complaints of harassment.
After application to the ITC, the Commission would conduct a preliminary investigation. If warranted, it would request a foreign investigation conducted by Treasury. The Commission would report its
findings on the effect of imports on the domestic industry to the
President, and, if necessary, would make recommendations about
relief, which could encompass all of the options now available under
a number of existing laws. Although it would be possible to draft a
statute that would preserve all of the standards and remedies of existing laws, it would make more sense to modify them into a more
consistent pattern. The only substantive change that this limited proposal would effect would be to give the President the last word in all
cases, including antidumping and countervailing duties cases. Congress would probably also insist on an override provision.
Settlement of Dumping Cases
The resolution of dumping cases by settlement should be encouraged
at all stages of the proceeding. If a dumping dispute is seen as a
problem in the economic foreign policy of the United States, then we
should be receptive to resolution by negotiation with the interested
foreign parties (including the foreign government, if it chooses).
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Treasury went too far some years ago when it tightened the rules
with respect to discontinuances. 12 A case need not proceed to a
dumping finding, with the consequent administrative burdens on
both the Customs Service and the firms, to discourage excessively
low prices. Normally companies charged with dumping are quite
willing to reconsider their prices. The moment Treasury has word
that a dumping complaint is being filed, it should notify the foreign
government concerned. Treasury should seek agreement on the part
of the foreign industry concerned (with or without the participation
of its government) that dumping will not take place. This procedure
should be analogous to a consent order in judicial and Federal Trade
Commission cases-without admitting any violation, the business
concerned would agree that the acts complained of would not take
place in the future.
Safeguards are needed to prevent a settlement procedure from becoming simply a device for private anticompetitive agreements.
Complaining parties must be given a reasonable voice in any such
procedure, but they should not be given a veto. The antitrust problem
of private contacts is a real one, but it may not be as anticompetitive
as the drying up of foreign competition that so often accompanies the
mere institution of an antidumping investigation. The present attitude in these matters by the Antitrust Division of the Department of
Justice appears to be that contact between the respective private
parties must be sedulously avoided. This attitude is excessively cautious. What should be enforced fully is the requirement that any arrangements be fully approved by the appropriate United States government authorities.
Specific Changes in the Law and Practice
There has been much criticism in the Congress recently suggesting
that the administration of the Act has been ineffective and that both
the law itself and its administration need to be tightened. Far from being an ineffective instrument for protecting American producers unfairly injured by iinports, the Act is too effective, and involves at least
four specific forms of overkill that should be eliminated from the law.
Collection of ProvisionalDuties
After dumping findings have been made, the Treasury Department
and Customs Service have sometimes been unable to assess the
dumping duties. This was most notable in the television cases. 13 To
make collection easier and to provide a further deterrent to dumping,
a proposal has been seriously advanced that provisional dumping
duties be fixed and collected at a preliminary phase of the investigation, based on margins found in the LTFV phase, rather than after
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final determination. 14 In my opinion this proposal misses the real
problems-the inherent complexity of the determination of dumping
duties, insufficient personnel assigned to the task, and consequent
breakdown of the administrative process. If the post-dumping finding master lists are promptly prepared, this problem will disappear.
In any event, any estimated duties must in fairness take account of
the latest data submitted.
Comparison of Each Export Transactionwith Average Home
Market Prices
Treasury regulations provide that unless there is a clear preponderance of merchandise sold at the same price in the home market,
Treasury will compare prices of sales in the United States to an average price in the home market. 15 If one imagines a simple model in
which the average price in the home market for a given period is
exactly the same as the average price for export to the United States,
then one half of the sales for export must be at LTFV margins. Thus
it is common that, under the administration of the United States law,
dumping is found where, by any normal test, there is no dumping,
and the margins found exceed the true margins. This result is not
required by the statute, and it can easily be remedied by changing
the regulation.
After the investigation is complete and a finding of dumping has
been made, Treasury does not follow the averaging technique in assessing dumping duties, but looks for a sale in the home market with
which to compare each entry into the United States. This practice
should be adapted to the fair value phase of the investigation. LTFV
sales should not be found if, in comparing the band of export sales
with the band of home market sales, there exists a home market sale
corresponding to the export sale under examination.
Difference in Circumstancesof Sale
If it is established to the satisfaction of the secretary that the difference between the home market price and the export price is "wholly
or partly due to... differences in circumstances of sale ...

then due

'' 6
allowance should be made therefor. 1
The regulations put an unjustified limitation on the statute's unambiguous words by providing that "differences in circumstances of
sale for which such allowances will be made are limited, in general,
to those circumstances which bear a direct relationship to the sales
7
which are under consideration.'
This small difference in language results in rejection of selling and
distribution costs that are clearly different and can readily be calculated under accepted accounting principles. For example, where
a company has a domestic but no overseas distribution network,
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comparison to domestic costs and prices will lead to a finding of
LTFV sales where there really were none. 18
Section 205(b) Relating to Sales in the Home Market below Cost of
Production
In the 1974 Act, the Antidumping Act was amended to add section
205(b), 19 U.S.C. § 164(b).
Whenever the Secretary has reasonable grounds to believe or suspect that sales in the home market of the country of exportation,
or, as appropriate, to countries other than the United States, have
been made at prices which represent less than the cost of producing the merchandise in question, he shall determine whether, in
fact, such sales were made at less than the cost of producing the
merchandise. If the Secretary determines that sales made at less
than cost of production (1) have been made over an extended period of time and in substantial quantities, and (2) are not at prices
which permit recovery of all costs within a reasonable period of
time in the normal course of trade, such sales shall be disregarded
in the determination of foreign market value. Whenever sales are
disregarded by virtue of having been made at less than the cost of
production and the remaining sales, made at not less than cost of
production, are determined to be inadequate as a basis for the
determination of foreign market value the Secretary shall determine that no foreign market value exists and employ the constructed value of the merchandise in question.' 9
The corresponding regulations track the statute, but add the following sentence: "The cost of production ordinarily will be computed
on the basis of the actual costs of materials, labor and general expenses, excluding profit, or, if necessary, on the basis of the best
evidence available. 20o In addition, Treasury has ruled that "an extended period of time" refers to a complete business cycle for the
2
industry in question. 1
Section 205(b) raises two questions. Is the underlying premise that
sales below cost are ipso facto below fair value sound? Is the legislative technique by which the unfairness is countered sound?
The situation attacked by this section-where the producer sustains sales in both home and export markets at prices that do not
cover full cost-has not been regarded as dumping in the classic
definition. 22 Section 205(b) is not only inconsistent with United
States international obligations based on the classic definition; it is
also undesirable in its own right, as removing from the scope of
international negotiation an area that is particularly suited for resolution by international agreement.
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Technically, section 205(b) is inconsistent with United States obligations as set forth in the GATT and in the International Dumping
Code. Article VI of the GATT provides that the comparison shall be
made with "the comparable price, in the ordinary course of trade, for
the like product when destined for consumption in the exporting
country, or, in the absence of such domestic price, ....
" by third
23
country sales or cost of production.
Article VI is unambiguous; if there are domestic sales, they must
be used. The Antidumping Code expression "if such sales do not
permit a proper comparison" 24 was intended to legitimize the practice of disregarding home market sales if they were too few to constitute a comparable market; the phrase cannot be stretched to justify
disregarding a large number of domestic sales, made in the usual
course of trade, on the ground that they are below average costs. So
drastic a change cannot be read into a general expression of this sort.
Nor can it reasonably be argued that below-cost sales are ipso facto
not in the usual course of trade.
Aside from its inconsistency with United States international obligations, the practice of treating sustained sales below full cost as
ipso facto below fair value is an undesirable extension of dumping
principles. The situation can arise only in the exceptional circumstance, such as afflicted the world steel industry in 1975 and 1976, in
which basic industries operate below capacity due to insufficient
world demand, had no way to operate profitably under conditions of
free competition until demand improved, and for reasons of national
policy could not be allowed to go out of business. Such a situation
calls for government-sponsored international regulation, which is
what happened in the steel sector. The United States adopted the
TPM and the EC adopted the Davignon Plan, 25 amid extensive international consultations.
The TPM is, in theory, founded on Treasury's right to institute
proceedings under the Act.26 But the mechanism is so free an adaptation of the United States law that it cannot be said to demonstrate
the validity of section 205(b). For instance, the TPM is based upon
the cost as calculated, with major judgmental variations, of the supposedly most efficient producing country, Japan. It is a very broad
application of the Act to apply those costs to all sources exporting to
the United States, and the judgmental variations permit Treasury to
vary the trigger prices in response to various objectives, such as
allowing enough imports to serve the needs of the United States market and dampening undue inflationary price effects.
It would have been simpler to provide in section 205(b) that exports to the United States at prices below full cost were ipso facto
below fair value without regard to whether or not they were below
home market or third country prices. Probably most of the legislators
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thought they were so providing. The actual drafting technique was to
provide that below-cost home market (or third country) sales are to
be disregarded, leaving constructed value or cost of production as the
basis of comparison, if remaining home market (third country) sales
are insufficient as a basis.
Constructed value is not always applied, because there are often
enough sales above cost in the home market to be a basis of comparison. This aggravates the unfair comparison of each export sale with
average home market sales discussed above. Section 205(b) requires
Treasury to disregard certain prices that are below cost in arriving at
the average home market price. The result is to introduce a double
bias. Each export to the United States is compared with a group of
sales necessarily above average in the home market.
This particular legislative technique was probably meant to help
reconcile section 205(b) with the GATT and the Antidumping Code,
discussed above. Had it frankly stated that below cost export sales
were below fair value, it would clearly have been inconsistent with
those international agreements.
For the reasons indicated, section 205(b) should be eliminated
from the Act, and problems of widespread overcapacity in basic industries should be dealt with through international negotiations. In
the absence of legislative modification, two changes in Treasury Department practice are recommended.
First, Treasury should find the home market price for a particular
article in the usual way, using average or predominant price, and
then apply section 205(b) only if that price is below cost of production; even then, Treasury should exclude only those sales that bring
the average price to below cost.
The effects of this section can also be mitigated by a high threshold
test. As a matter of statutory construction, the words "reasonable
grounds to believe or suspect" in section 205(b) could be construed in
paripassu with the expression "reason to believe or suspect" used in
section 201(b) of the Antidumping Act, which relates to the preliminary LTFV determination made after six months of investigation. The
latter finding is made upon a substantial evidentiary record, as Congress was well aware when it enacted section 205(b). There is a strong
argument, therefore, that the Secretary should require a similarly
strong evidentiary record of below-cost sales before he investigates
the cost of production. Treasury's practice has been to decide to investigate the cost of production upon fairly thin allegations in the complaint. A decision at that early point is not necessary. The Secretary
has authority to extend investigations to nine months, and this could
be the normal course where cost of production is investigated. Only
after a strong showing by complainants, thoroughly reviewed by Treasury, or after the initial stages of an investigation have disclosed good
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reasons, should there be an investigation of cost of production. Treasury should also make public the charges of sales below the cost of
production, and invite comments from interested parties before deciding to initiate a cost of production investigation.

CONCLUSION

This article falls far short of doing justice to a subject that acquires
more and more complexity the more it is examined. 27 Because the
litigationlike procedures of the Antidumping Act are basically unsuited to the resolution of the problems for economic foreign policy
presented by dumping, it should be either repealed or significantly
amended. The escape clause, section 201 of the 1974 Trade Act, is
much better suited for vindicating the national interest in cases in
which domestic producers suffer from foreign competition.
Since repeal is politically unlikely, a number of changes should be
made in either the practice or the law itself to streamline proceedings, hasten resolution, and allow for more comprehensive consideration of the national interest than is permissible under the current
law and practice.
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